UAV-Enabled Confidential Data Collection in Wireless Networks by Zhou, Xiaobo et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
00
75
9v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
P]
  3
 Ja
n 2
02
0
1
UAV-Enabled Confidential Data Collection in
Wireless Networks
Xiaobo Zhou, Student Member, IEEE, Shihao Yan, Member, IEEE, Min Li, Member, IEEE,
Jun Li, Senior Member, IEEE, and Feng Shu, Member, IEEE
Abstract—This work, for the first time, considers confidential
data collection in the context of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
wireless networks, where the scheduled ground sensor node (SN)
intends to transmit confidential information to the UAV without
being intercepted by other unscheduled ground SNs. Specifically,
a full-duplex (FD) UAV collects data from each scheduled SN
on the ground and generates artificial noise (AN) to prevent the
scheduled SN’s confidential information from being wiretapped
by other unscheduled SNs. We first derive the reliability outage
probability (ROP) and secrecy outage probability (SOP) of a
considered fixed-rate transmission, based on which we formulate
an optimization problem that maximizes the minimum average
secrecy rate (ASR) subject to some specific constraints. We then
transform the formulated optimization problem into a convex
problem with the aid of first-order restrictive approximation
technique and penalty method. The resultant problem is a
generalized nonlinear convex programming (GNCP) and solving
it directly still leads to a high complexity, which motivates
us to further approximate this problem as a second-order
cone program (SOCP) in order to reduce the computational
complexity. Finally, we develop an iteration procedure based on
penalty successive convex approximation (P-SCA) algorithm to
pursue the solution to the formulated optimization problem. Our
examination shows that the developed joint design achieves a
significant performance gain compared to a benchmark scheme.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, UAV communications,
data collection, artificial noise, trajectory optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been
widely utilized in wireless communication networks, due to
their on-demand deployment, low cost, controllable mobil-
ity and high probability of line-of-sight (LoS) air-to-ground
link [1]. In general, UAVs mainly serve as mobile base
stations, relays, information disseminators, and data collectors
in wireless networks to assist various applications [2]. Specifi-
cally, UAVs can be used as mobile base stations to increase the
coverage area or capacity of the conventional terrestrial wire-
less networks (e.g., [3]–[5]). For example, UAV-mounted base
station can be employed to recover communication service
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after the ground communication infrastructure being damaged
in natural disasters. In addition, UAVs can also be employed
as mobile relays to provide reliable wireless connections
between two or more wireless devices, between which the
direct communication links are severely blocked due to large-
bodied obstacles (e.g., [6], [7]). Compared to the traditional
static relays on the ground, UAV relays can significantly
improve the communication performance, since its optimal
deployment location can be dynamically adjusted according
to the time-varying communication channels. Furthermore,
UAVs can be deployed as mobile information disseminators
or data collectors to assist the emerging Internet of Things
(IoT) applications (e.g., [8], [9]). For instance, UAVs can move
sufficiently close to each ground sensor node (SN) to enhance
the channel quality from the SN to the UAVs in wireless sensor
networks (WSNs), which are deployed in remote areas.
Due to the inherent broadcast nature of wireless channels,
crucial concerns on the wireless communication security are
emerging [10]–[13]. In UAV networks, it becomes easier
for an eavesdropper to intercept the confidential messages
transmitted by the UAV, due to the high probability of the
existence of the LoS channel between the UAV and the
ground eavesdropper, which poses new security challenges
in the context of UAV wireless networks [14]. Against this
background, several recent works were devoted to addressing
the wireless communication security in the context of the UAV
networks from the perspective of physical layer security (e.g.,
[15]–[24]). In [15], the authors jointly optimized the UAV’s
trajectory and transmit power to effectively enhance the chan-
nel quality of the legitimate communication link and degrade
the channel quality of the eavesdropping link. Meanwhile,
utilizing a UAV as a mobile friendly jammer was considered in
[16], [17] to improve the communication security of wireless
communication networks, where the UAV jammer aimed to
create AN to confuse the eavesdropper. Along this direction,
the communication security of the wireless network consisting
of two cooperative UAVs and multiple users was examined
in [18], [19], where one UAV was deployed to transmit
confidential messages to ground users, while the other UAV
generated AN to create interference to the eavesdropper. The
secure communication in UAV relay networks was considered
in [20], [21], where a UAV was utilized as a mobile relay to
improve the communication security performance by adjusting
its location dynamically. Furthermore, the secrecy rate of a
cellular-connected UAV IoT network with spatially distributed
eavesdroppers was investigated in [22]. In addition to ran-
domly distributed eavesdroppers, a full-duplex (FD) active
2eavesdropper in the context of UAV networks was considered
in [23], where the eavesdropper performed both malicious
jamming and eavesdropping simultaneously. Most recently, the
authors of [24] considered a practical scenario, where the UAV
only knew each eavesdropper’s imperfect location information
and the estimation error on the locations of eavesdroppers was
assumed within an uncertain circular region. In this scenario,
the robust UAV trajectory and transmit power were jointly
designed to maximize the average secrecy rate (ASR) for a
worse-case scenario.
WSNs are usually deployed in different application scenar-
ios to collect various data, such as in earthquake monitoring,
soil moisture monitoring, and wildlife tracking [25]. However,
in many cases it is difficult to collect the data from sensors in
WSNs, since many sensors may be located in remote areas
without communication coverage. Against this background,
utilizing a UAV as a data collector is highly desirable in
remote WNSs due to its remarkably advantages in terms
of on-demand deployment and high mobility. For example,
recent works [8] and [26] showed that the UAV data collector
can sequentially visit each SN and can move sufficiently
close to the scheduled SN for enhancing the quality of the
communication link from the ground SN to the UAV. In
addition, a flight time minimization problem in the context of
UAV data collection network was studied in [25]. However, the
wireless communication security of such UAV data collection
networks was completely overlooked in the literature, which is
a critical issue in some application scenarios. For example, the
scheduled SN may prefer to keep its transmitted information
confidential from other unscheduled SNs (e.g., a spy intends
to transmit the stolen information to his base without being
wiretapped by others).
Against the aforementioned background, in this work we
address the confidential data collection with the aid of a UAV
from the perspective of physical layer security. Specifically,
in order to prevent the confidential information transmitted by
the scheduled SN from being intercepted by other unscheduled
SNs, a FD UAV generates AN to interfere with other SNs
when it gathers critical information from the scheduled SN.
Our goal is to maximize the minimum ASR among all SNs
on the ground via jointly optimizing the UAV’s trajectory and
AN transmit power as well as the transmission rates and SN
scheduling strategy, which is a new design framework that
jointly considers the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and
the reliability outage probability (ROP) constraints in UAV
networks. The main contributions of this work are summarized
as below.
• For the first time, we consider the UAV-enabled confiden-
tial data collection from the perspective of physical layer
security. The transmission in the considered system is
always subject to the reliability and security outages due
to the fact that the UAV suffers from the self-interference
and the instantaneous channel state information (CSI)
from the scheduled SN to the unscheduled SNs is unavail-
able. As such, in order to facilitate solving the optimal
design problem, we first derive an analytical expression
for the ROP, which determines the codeword rate based
on a given maximum allowable ROP. We then derive the
SOP expression for each unscheduled SNs, which enables
us to determine the SOP constraint analytically in our
considered system model.
• We formulate an optimization problem to determine the
UAV trajectory, AN transmit power, transmission rates,
and the SN scheduling in order to maximize the min-
imum ASR by considering the fairness among the K
ground SNs. The formulated optimization problem is
a mixed-integer non-convex problem, which is hard to
solve directly. Thus, we develop an iterative algorithm
based on the penalty successive convex approximation (P-
SCA) technique to pursue a suboptimal solution to this
problem. To this end, we first convert the problem into
a continuous optimization problem, then we construct a
penalty function that violates the binary constraint, and
finally we apply the first-order restrictive approximation
method to transform the initial optimization problem into
a convex problem.
• The resultant optimization problem in each iteration
can be categorized as a generalized nonlinear convex
programming (GNCP), since it involves a general expo-
nential cone constraint. We note that solving the convex
exponential cone often leads to a high computational
complexity. Thus, we develop a novel method to trans-
form the GNCP problem into a standard second-order
cone program (SOCP), which is of a lower complexity.
Numerical results show that the UAV’s trajectory has a
significant impact on the max-min ASR in the considered
system. Our examination also shows that the UAV’s
trajectory achieved by our developed P-SCA scheme
always shrinks inward relative to the region determined
by all the ground SNs.
The reminder of this work is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the considered system model together
with the adopted assumptions. In Section III, we first formulate
the optimal design problem and then derive the analytical
expressions for ROP and SOP. In Section IV, we develop a
P-SCA scheme to tackle the formulated optimization problem
in order to jointly design the UAV’s trajectory, AN transmit
power, transmission rates, and the SN scheduling. Numerical
results are presented in Section V to examine the performance
of the developed scheme and Section V presents our conclu-
sion remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Considered Scenario and Adopted Assumptions
As shown in Fig. 1, in this work we consider a UAV
communication network, where a UAV acts as a data collector
to gather information from K ground SNs and each SN wants
to transmit its confidential information to the UAV without
being wiretapped on by other SNs. We assume that at most
one SN is scheduled for communication with the UAV at each
time instant. In order to prevent the confidential information
transmitted by the scheduled SN from being intercepted by
other unscheduled SNs, we consider a FD UAV, which is
equipped with a receive antenna and a transmit antenna, for
secure data collection. Specifically, when the UAV gathers the
3Unscheduled SNsScheduled SN
UAV
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confidential data from the scheduled k-th SN, the UAV also
simultaneously generates AN to interfere with other SNs. The
UAV’s flight period and flight altitude are set to T and H ,
respectively. The horizontal coordinates of the k-th SN and
the UAV are denoted as wk ∈ R2×1 (k ∈ K , {1, 2, · · · ,K})
and qu(t) ∈ R2×1, where 0 ≤ t ≤ T . In general, the UAV
flies with a limited speed, and its flying speed constraint can
be expressed as q˙u(t) ≤ Vmax, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where q˙u(t)
denotes the time-derivative of qu(t) and Vmax is the UAV’s
maximum flying speed. We note that the UAV’s flying speed
constraint is continuous with respect to the flying time t, which
implies an infinite number of speed constraints. To overcome
this problem, we divide T into N time slots, i.e., T = Nδt,
where δt denotes the duration of each time slot. Then, at the
n-th time slot, the UAV’s horizontal coordinate is given by
qu[n] ∈ R2×1 (n ∈ N , {1, 2 · · · , N}). Following the above
clarifications, the mobility constraints of the UAV are given
by
qu[1] = qu[N ], (1a)
‖qu[n+ 1]− qu[n]‖ ≤ Vmaxδt, n ∈ N \ {N}, (1b)
where (1a) implies that the UAV has to return to the initial
location by the end of the last time slot, while (1b) denotes
the UAV’s maximum flying distance within each time slot.
Let Pu[n] denote the UAV’s AN transmit power at the n-th
time slot, the peak transmit power constraint is given by
0 ≤ Pu[n] ≤ Pumax, ∀n, (2)
where Pumax denotes the maximum transmit power of the UAV.
We assume that at most one SN is scheduled at each time
slot, and αk[n] ∈ {0, 1} denotes the SN scheduling indicator,
where αk[n] = 1 indicates that the k-th SN is scheduled for
transmission at the n-th time slot. As such, the SN scheduling
constraint can be expressed as
K∑
k=1
αk[n] ≤ 1, ∀n, αk[n] ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k, n. (3)
B. Channel Model and Received Signals
Considering that the air-to-ground and ground-to-air chan-
nels are dominated by the LoS [18], the channel from the k-th
SN to the UAV or the channel from the UAV to the k-th SN
is given by
hk,u[n] = hu,k[n] =
√
β0
‖qu[n]−wk‖2 +H2 , ∀k, n, (4)
where β0 denotes the power gain at a reference distance 1
meter (m). The channel from the k-th scheduled SN to the
m-th unscheduled SN and the self-interference channel of
UAV are denoted by gk,m[n] (m ∈ K \ {k}) and gu,u[n],
respectively. We note that gk,m[n] and gu,u[n] are assumed
to be subject to quasi-static Rayleigh fading, i.e., gk,m[n] and
gu,u[n] follow CN (0, λk,m) and CN (0, λu,u), respectively. We
assume that the scheduled SN only knows the channel distri-
bution information (CDI) between itself and other unscheduled
SNs, while the exact instantaneous channel state information
(CSI) is unavailable. Considering that the SNs intend to deliver
the collected information to the UAV, we assume that the UAV
knows the location information of each SN and thus knows
the corresponding CSI.
When the k-th SN is scheduled at the n-th time slot, the
received signal at the UAV is given by
yu[n] =
√
P ks [n]hk,u[n]sk +
√
ρPu[n]gu,u[n]su + zu, (5)
where P ks [n] is the transmit power of the k-th scheduled
SN, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 denotes the self-interference cancellation
coefficient, and zu is the Gaussian noise at the UAV with
mean 0 and variance σ2u. In addition, sk and su are confidential
signal and AN signal, respectively, which satisfy E[|sk|2] = 1
and E[|su|2] = 1, respectively.
As per (5), the channel capacity from the k-th scheduled
SN to the UAV at the n-th time slot is given by
Ck,u[n] = log2
(
1 +
P ks [n]|hk,u[n]|2
ρPu[n]|gu,u[n]|2 + σ2u
)
. (6)
When the k-th SN is scheduled at the n-th time slot, the
received signal at the m-th SN, m ∈ K \ {k}, is given by
ym[n] =
√
P ks [n]gk,m[n]sk +
√
Pu[n]hu,m[n]su + zm, (7)
where zm is the Gaussian noise at the m-th unscheduled SN
with mean 0 and variance σ2m. The channel capacity from
the k-th scheduled SN to the m-th unscheduled SN can be
expressed as
Ck,m[n] = log2
(
1 +
P ks [n]|gk,m[n]|2
Pu[n]|hu,m[n]|2 + σ2m
)
. (8)
C. Fixed-Rate Transmission and Outage Probabilities
In order to achieve secure transmission, the scheduled SN
adopts a wiretap code to transmit information to the UAV,
in which two rates, i.e., the codeword rate Rk,u[n] and the
redundancy rate Rk,e[n], have to be determined [27]–[30].
In this work, we consider a fixed-rate transmission from the
scheduled SN to the UAV, where Rk,u[n] and Rk,e[n] are
predetermined and to be optimized.
The transmission from the k-th SN to the UAV may occur
outage since the UAV suffers from the self-interference. As
such, when the k-th SN is scheduled, the ROP (i.e., reliability
4outage probability) from the k-th SN to the UAV can be
expressed as
prok [n] = Pr(Rk,u[n] > Ck,u[n]), (9)
where we recall that Rk,u[n] is the codeword rate used for the
transmission from SN k to the UAV.
In our considered scenario, perfect secrecy cannot be guar-
anteed, since the scheduled SN only has the CDI of unsched-
uled SNs. As such, when the k-th SN is scheduled at the n-th
time slot, the SOP (i.e., secrecy outage probability) is given
by
psok [n] = Pr
(
Rk,e[n] < max
m∈K\{k}
Ck,m[n]
)
, (10)
where we recall that Rk,e[n] denotes the redundancy rate used
to confuse the eavesdroppers (i.e., other unscheduled SNs).
In the following section, we first derive exact analytic
expressions for SOP and ROP. Then, we jointly design the
UAV’s trajectory and AN transmit power as well as the code
rates and the SN scheduling to maximize the minimum ASR
among all SNs subject to some specific constraints.
III. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FORMULATION
For ease of presentation, we define Q = {qu[n], ∀n}, A =
{αk[n], ∀k, n}, PU = {Pu[n], ∀n}, RU = {Rk,u[n], ∀k, n},
and RE = {Rk,e[n], ∀k, n}, where qu[n] is the UAV tra-
jectory, αk[n] is the scheduling variable, Pu[n] is the UAV’s
AN transmit power, Rk,u[n] is the transmission rate from SN
k to UAV, and Rk,e[n] is the cost of securing the message
transmission of SN k against eavesdropping. In order to ensure
that the UAV can serve each SN and guarantee the fairness
among all SNs, our design aim is to maximize the minimum
ASR among all SNs by jointly designing the UAV’s trajectory
Q, the SN scheduling A, the AN transmit power PU, the
transmission rate RU, and the redundancy rate RE. The
formulated optimization problem is given by
(P1) : max
Q,A,RU
PU,RE
min
∀k
1
N
N∑
n=1
αk[n] (Rk,u[n]−Rk,e[n]) (11a)
s.t.
K∑
k=1
αk[n]p
ro
k [n] ≤ ǫr, ∀n, (11b)
K∑
k=1
αk[n]p
so
k [n] ≤ ǫs, ∀n, (11c)
K∑
k=1
αk[n] ≤ 1, ∀n, (11d)
αk[n] ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k, n, (11e)
Pu[n] ≤ Pumax, ∀n, (11f)
qu[1] = qu[N ], (11g)
‖qu[n+ 1]− qu[n]‖ ≤ Vmaxδt, n ∈ N \ {N}. (11h)
We note that the term 1
N
∑N
n=1 αk[n] (Rk,u[n]−Rk,e[n])
in the objective function (11a) denotes the k-th SN’s ASR
(i.e., average secrecy rate) over N time slots, (11b) is the
ROP (i.e., reliability outage probability) constraint, where ǫr
is the maximum allowable ROP, (11c) is the SOP (i.e., secrecy
outage probability) constraint, where ǫs is the maximum toler-
able SOP determining the required security level. In addition,
(11d) and (11e) are SN scheduling constraints, which ensure
that at most one SN is scheduled at each time slot, while
(11f) is the UAV’s AN transmit power constraint. (11g) and
(11h) are the UAV’s mobility constraints. We note that the
ROP and SOP constraints are to guarantee the reliability and
security of the transmission from the scheduled SN to the
UAV, respectively, which are the two main constraints in
our considered optimization problem. In order to facilitate
solving the formulated optimization problem, we first derive
the analytic expressions for prok [n] and p
so
k [n] in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1: The analytic expressions for prok [n] defined in
(9) and prok [n] defined in (10) are given by
prok [n] = exp

 −1
ρPu[n]λu,u

 β0P
k
s [n]
‖qu[n]−wk‖2+H2
2Rk,u[n] − 1 − σ
2
u



 ,
(12)
and
psok [n] = 1−
∏
m∈K\{k}

1−exp

 β0Pu[n]‖qu[n]−wm‖2+H2 + σ2m
−Pks [n]λk,m
2Rk,e[n]−1



 ,
(13)
respectively.
Proof: The detailed proof is provided in Appendix A.
Remark 1: We first observe that our objective function
detailed in (11a) and prok [n] in (12) are increasing function of
Rk,u[n]. As such,
∑K
k=1 αk[n]p
ro
k [n] = ǫr must be satisfied
to maximize the ASR of each SN. We recall that at most
one SN is scheduled at each time slot. As such, when SN
k is scheduled,
∑K
k=1 αk[n]p
ro
k [n] = ǫr is equivalent to
prok [n] = ǫr. Thus, the transmission rate from the k-th SN
to the UAV can be written as a function of ǫr, given by
Rk,u[n] = log2

1 + β0P
k
s [n]
‖qu[n]−wk‖2+H2
−ρPu[n]λu,u ln ǫr + σ2u

 . (14)
We also observe that as the quality of the channel hk,u[n]
increases, Rk[n] detailed in (14) increases, while as the quality
of the channel hu,m[n] increases, the p
so
k [n] in (13) decreases.
We note that Rk[n] and p
so
k [n] decrease with the AN transmit
power Pu[n]. Thus, the UAV’s trajectory and AN transmit
power should be carefully designed to balance the transmission
rate and the communication security of our considered system.
Following (14), (P1) can be equivalently reformulated as
5log2

1 + β0P
k
s [n]
‖q˜u[n]−wk‖2+H2
−ρP˜u[n]λu,u ln ǫr + σ2u

+
−β0P
k
s [n](‖qu[n]−wk‖
2−‖q˜u[n]−wk‖
2)
‖q˜u[n]−wk‖2+H2(
(‖q˜u[n]−wk‖2 +H2)
(
−ρP˜u[n]λu,u ln ǫr + σ2u
)
+ β0P ks [n]
)
ln 2
+
−β0P
k
s [n](−ρPu[n]λu,u ln ǫr+ρP˜u[n]λu,u ln ǫr)
−ρP˜u[n]λu,u ln ǫr+σ2u(
(‖q˜u[n]−wk‖2 +H2)
(
−ρP˜u[n]λu,u ln ǫr + σ2u
)
+ β0P ks [n]
)
ln 2
−Rk,e[n] ≥ µk[n], ∀k, n. (27)
(P2) : max
Q,A
PU,RE
min
∀k
1
N
N∑
n=1
αk[n] (Rk,u[n]−Rk,e[n]) (15a)
s.t.
K∑
k=1
αk[n]p
so
k [n] ≤ ǫs, ∀n, (15b)
K∑
k=1
αk[n] ≤ 1, ∀n, (15c)
αk[n] ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k, n, (15d)
Pu[n] ≤ Pumax, ∀n, (15e)
qu[1] = qu[N ], (15f)
‖qu[n+ 1]− qu[n]‖ ≤ Vmaxδt, n ∈ N \ {N}, (15g)
where Rk,u[n] in objective function (15a) is defined in (14).
We note that the constraint (15c), the AN transmit power
constraint (15e), the mobility constraints (15f) and (15g)
are convex, while the objective function (15a) and the SOP
constraint (15b) are highly non-convex. Furthermore, the SN
scheduling variables αk[n], ∀k, n, are binary, and the optimiza-
tion variables are closely coupled in the objective function
(15a) and the SOP constraint (15b). As such, (P2) is a mixed-
integer non-convex optimization problem. We note that finding
the global optimal solution to this problem usually requires a
high-complexity exhaustive search, which is impractical. In
the following section, we develop a novel P-SCA algorithm,
which enables us to find a local optimal solution to (P2)
within a polynomial time period.
IV. UAV’S SECURE DATA COLLECTION DESIGN
In this section, we jointly design the UAV’s trajectory, AN
transmit power and the redundancy rate as well as the SN
scheduling with the aim to solve the formulated optimization
problem (P2). We first transform (P2) into a convex opti-
mization problem, then we further convert it into a SOCP, and
finally we develop a P-SCA algorithm to solve it.
A. Transform (P2) into a Convex Optimization Problem
In this subsection, we aim to transform the mixed-integer
non-convex problem (P2) into a convex optimization problem.
Specifically, we first introduce a penalty factor to transform
(P2) into a continuous optimization problem. Then, we em-
ploy the first-order restrictive method to convert the continuous
optimization problem into a convex optimization problem.
To proceed, we note that (15d) can actually be equivalently
rewritten as the following continuous constraint, i.e.,
αk[n]− αk[n]2 ≤ 0, ∀k, n, (16a)
0 ≤ αk[n] ≤ 1, ∀k, n, (16b)
where αk[n] ≤ 0 or αk[n] ≥ 1 must hold in (16a). Combining
(16a) and (16b), we have αk[n] = 0 or αk[n] = 1. We note
that (16) can be further simplified as
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
(
αk[n]− αk[n]2
) ≤ 0, (17a)
0 ≤ αk[n] ≤ 1, ∀k, n. (17b)
We note that the number of constraints in (17) is fewer than
that in (16), which can significantly reduce the computational
complexity of solving (P2). Introducing a slack variable η
and replacing the binary constraint (15d) by (17), problem
(P2) can be equivalently rewritten as
(P2.1) : max
Q,A,η
PU,RE
η (18a)
s.t.
1
N
N∑
n=1
αk[n] (Rk,u[n]−Rk,e[n]) ≥ η, ∀k, (18b)
(15b), (15c), (15e), (15f), (15g), (17a), (17b). (18c)
Although we have transformed the original mixed-integer
optimization problem (P2) into the continuous optimization
problem (P2.1), it is still non-convex due to the constraints
(15b) and (17a) together with (18b). In general, we can
apply the first-order restrictive approximation to transform the
problem (P2.1) into a convex optimization problem and then
employ the SCA technique to solve the resultant problem.
However, direct applying the SCA technique will make it
difficult to find the initial feasible solution due to the joint
existence of (17a) and (17b). To overcome this issue, we
introduce a slack variable φ to extend feasible set of constraint
(17) and develop a penalty method to add this slack variable
φ into the objective function. Then, the resultant optimization
problem is given by
(P2.2) : max
Q,A,η
PU,RE,φ
η − ωφ (19a)
s.t.
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
(
αk[n]− αk[n]2
) ≤ φ, (19b)
(15b), (15c), (15e), (15f), (15g), (17b), (18b), (19c)
6where ω > 0 is a penalty parameter. We note that φ is to be
minimized in (P2.2) and φ = 0 immediately implies that
(P2.2) is equivalent to (P2.1). In the following, we first
apply the first-order restrictive approximation to transform the
non-convex SN scheduling constraint (19b), constraint (18b),
and SOP constraint (15b) into convex constraints. Then, we
develop a P-SCA algorithm to solve the achieved optimization
problem.
1) The constraint (19b): We observe that each summation
term on the left hand side (LHS) of (19b) is in the form
of a linear function minus a quadratic convex function. This
special form allows us to apply the first-order restrictive
approximation to transform the constraint (19b) into a convex
constraint. We note that any convex function is lower bounded
by its first-order approximation. Thus, for given feasible points
α˜k[n], ∀k, n, (19b) can be rewritten as
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
(
αk[n] + α˜k[n]
2 − 2α˜k[n]αk[n]
) ≤ φ. (20)
We note that (20) is a convex constraint due to the fact that it
is a linear function with respect to the SN scheduling variable
αk[n] and slack variable φ. We also note that the constraint
(20) is stricter than the constraint (19b). As such, any solution
satisfying (20) can also guarantee (19b).
2) The constraint (18b): Substituting Rk,u[n] defined in
(14) into (18b), the resultant constraint is given by
N∑
n=1
αk[n]

log2

1 + β0P
k
s [n]
‖qu[n]−wk‖2+H2
−ρPu[n]λu,u ln ǫr+σ2u

−Rk,e[n]


≥ Nη, ∀k. (21)
We observe that the constraint (21) is a non-convex constraint
due to the fact that the UAV trajectory qu[n] and AN transmit
power Pu[n] together with SN scheduling αk[n] in constraint
(21) are closely coupled, which makes it difficult to handle
directly. To facilitate tackling this constraint, we first introduce
slack variables µk[n], ∀k, n, and then we rewrite (21) as
N∑
n=1
αk[n]µk[n] ≥ Nη, ∀k, (22a)
log2

1 + β0P
k
s [n]
‖qu[n]−wk‖2+H2
−ρPu[n]λu,u ln ǫr + σ2u

−Rk,e[n] ≥ µk[n],
∀k, n. (22b)
We note that, although (22a) and (22b) are still non-convex,
they are easier to be tackled than the original constraint (18b).
In the following, we handle the constraints (22a) and (22b)
based on their special structures. To proceed, we first observe
that (22a) can be equivalently rewritten as
N∑
n=1
[
(αk[n] + µk[n])
2−(αk[n]− µk[n])2
] ≥ 4Nη, ∀k. (23)
We note that the LHS of (23) is in the form of the difference
of two quadratic convex functions. As such, for given feasible
points α˜k[n] and µ˜k[n], the first-order restrictive approxima-
tion of (23) is given by
N∑
n=1
[
2(α˜k[n] + µ˜k[n])(αk[n] + µk[n])
− (α˜k[n] + µ˜k[n])2 − (αk[n]− µk[n])2
] ≥ 4Nη, ∀k. (24)
We note that the constraint (24) is a convex constraint and it
is stricter than (23). Furthermore, (23) and (24) are equivalent
at the given feasible points α˜k[n] and µ˜k[n].
To facilitate dealing with the non-convex constraint (22b),
we first define a function f1(x1, x2), which is given by
f1(x1, x2) = log2
(
1 +
c
x1x2
)
, (25)
where c ≥ 0, x1 > 0 and x2 > 0. We note that f1(x1, x2)
is jointly convex with respect to x1 and x2 [31]. Following
the fact that any convex function is lower bounded by its first
order approximation, we have the following inequality
f1(x1, x2) ≥ log2
(
1 +
c
x˜1x˜2
)
+
−c(x1 − x˜1)
x˜1(x˜1x˜2 + c) ln 2
+
−c(x2 − x˜2)
x˜2(x˜1x˜2 + c) ln 2
, (26)
where x˜1 and x˜2 are first-order Taylor expansion points.
Now, we return to the constraint (22b). We observe that
the term log2
(
1 +
β0P
k
s [n]
‖qu[n]−wk‖
2+H2
−ρPu[n]λu,u ln ǫr+σ2u
)
in (22b) is in a
similar form as (25). Specifically, β0P
k
s [n] ≥ 0, ‖qu[n] −
wk‖2 + H2 > 0, and −ρPu[n]λu,u ln ǫr + σ2u > 0
must hold. Following the convexity of f1(x1, x2), the term
log2
(
1 +
β0P
k
s [n]
‖qu[n]−wk‖
2+H2
−ρPu[n]λu,u ln ǫr+σ2u
)
is jointly convex with respect
to ‖qu[n] − wk‖2 + H2 and −ρPu[n]λu,u ln ǫr + σ2u. We
replace c, x1, x2, x˜1, and x˜2 in (26) with β0P
k
s [n], ‖qu[n]−
wk‖2 +H2, −ρPu[n]λu,u ln ǫr + σ2u, ‖q˜u[n] −wk‖2 +H2,
and −ρP˜u[n]λu,u ln ǫr+σ2u, respectively. Then, the first-order
restrictive approximation of the constraint (22b) is given by
(27), which is presented at the top of previous page. We note
that (27) is a convex constraint.
So far, we have transformed the non-convex constraint (18b)
into the convex constraints (24) and (27).
3) The SOP constraint (15b): We first substitute (13) into
the SOP constraint (15b) and we have
K∑
k=1
αk[n]

1− ∏
m∈K\{k}

1−exp

 β0Pu[n]‖qu[n]−wm‖2+H2 +σ2m
−Pks [n]λk,m
2Rk,e[n]−1






≤ ǫs, ∀n. (28)
We note that the main challenge to tackle the constraint (28)
arises from the fact that the expression of (28) is of a high
complexity and the optimization variables in constraint (28)
are closely coupled. To overcome this challenge, we introduce
7slack variables νk[n], ∀k, n, and rewrite the constraint (28) as
K∑
k=1
αk[n]νk[n] ≤ ǫs, ∀n, (29a)
1−
∏
m∈K\{k}

1− exp

 β0Pu[n]‖qu[n]−wm‖2+H2 + σ2m
−Pks [n]λk,m
2Rk,e[n]−1



 ≤ νk[n],
∀k, n. (29b)
We note that (29a) and (29b) are still non-convex constraints.
However, they are relatively easier to tackle compared with
the original SOP constraint (28). In the following, we focus
on handling the non-convex constraints (29a) and (29b).
We first note that (29a) can be equivalently rewritten as
K∑
k=1
[
(αk[n] + νk[n])
2−(αk[n]− νk[n])2
] ≤ 4ǫs, ∀n. (30)
Similar to (23), for given feasible points α˜k[n] and ν˜k[n],
∀k, n, the first-order restrictive approximation of (30) is given
by
K∑
k=1
[− 2(α˜k[n]− ν˜k[n])(αk[n]− α˜k[n] + ν˜k[n]− νk[n])
+ (αk[n] + νk[n])
2−(α˜k[n]− ν˜k[n])2
] ≤ 4ǫs, ∀n. (31)
For the non-convex constraint (29b), we first observe that
(29b) is in the form of the product of multiple exponential
functions, which is generally difficult to handle. We recall
that the function
∏K
k=1
1
ek
is a convex function for ek > 0
[32]. Following this fact, we introduce slack variables θk,m[n],
∀k, n,m ∈ K \ {k}, and rewrite (29b) as
K∏
m=1,m 6=k
1
θk,m[n]
≥ 1− νk[n], ∀k, n. (32a)
1− exp

 β0Pu[n]‖qu[n]−wm‖2+H2 + σ2m
−Pks [n]λk,m
2Rk,e[n]−1

 ≥ 1
θk,m[n]
,
∀k, n,m ∈ K \ {k}. (32b)
We note that (32a) is in the form of the super-level set of
a convex function, which is non-convex. In addition, (32b)
is also a non-convex constraint, which is difficult to tackle
directly due to the fact that the expression of (32b) is of a
high complexity. In the following, we aim to transform (32a)
and (32b) into convex constraints.
To handle the non-convex constraint (32a), we first present
the following inequality by performing the first-order Taylor
approximation at points θ˜k,m[n], m ∈ K \ {k}, i.e.,
K∏
m=1,m 6=k
1
θk,m[n]
≥ f2
(
θk,m[n], θ˜k,m[n]
)
,
K∑
m=1,m 6=k
−θk,m[n]
θ˜k,m[n]
+K
K∏
m=1,m 6=k
1
θ˜k,m[n]
, ∀k, n. (33)
We note that the inequality (33) is due to the fact that the
convexity of the function
∏K
m=1,m 6=k
1
θk,m[n]
. Following (33),
the first-order restrictive approximation of the constraint (32a)
is given by
f2
(
θk,m[n], θ˜k,m[n]
)
≥ 1− νk[n], ∀k, n. (34)
We note that the constraint (34) is linear with respect to the
introduced slack variables θk,m[n] and νk[n] for given feasible
point θ˜k,m[n]. As such, the constraint (34) is convex.
Now, we turn our attention to the non-convex constraint
(32b). To facilitate processing the constraint (32b), we first
introduce slack variables ςm[n] and τk[n], ∀k, n,m ∈ K\{k},
and then rewrite (32b) as
exp
( −σ2
P ks [n]λk,m
√
ςm[n]τk[n]
)
≤ 1− 1
θk,m[n]
, ∀k, n,m ∈ K \ {k}, (35a)
β0
σ2
Pu[n]
‖qu[n]−wm‖2+H2 +1 ≥
√
ςm[n], ∀n,m ∈ K\ {k},
(35b)
2Rk,e[n] −
√
τk[n] ≥ 1, ∀k, n. (35c)
We note that the constraint (35a) is convex due to the
following three facts. Firstly,
√
ςm[n]τk[n] is a geometric
mean function, which is a joint concave function with respect
to the introduced slack variables ςm[n] and τk[n]. Secondly, if
a function g(x) is convex then exp (g(x)) is convex, i.e., the
exponential function satisfies convexity-preserving operation.
Thirdly, 1 − 1
θk,m[n]
in the right hand side (RHS) of (35a) is
a concave function.
We observe that the LHS of the constraint (35b) is not a
convex function with respect to the optimization variables and
the RHS of (35b) is a concave function. Thus, (35b) is non-
convex. In addition, the constraint (35c) is non-convex due
to the fact that the super-level of a convex function is non-
convex. In the following, we present the detailed processes of
tackling (35b) and (35c).
To facilitate processing the constraint (35b), we first define
a function f3(x1, x2), which is given by
f3(x1, x2) =
c
x1x2
, (36)
where c ≥ 0, x1 > 0 and x2 > 0. We can see that f3(x1, x2)
is jointly convex with respect to x1 and x2 [31]. As a result,
we have the following inequality
f3(x1, x2) ≥ c
x˜1x˜2
− c(x1 − x˜1)
x˜21x˜2
− c(x2 − x˜2)
x˜1x˜22
, (37)
where x˜1 and x˜2 are first-order Taylor expansion points. In
order to apply the results of (37), we rearrange (35b) as
β0
σ2
1
Pu[n]
(‖qu[n]−wm‖2 +H2)
+ 1−
√
ςm[n]
≥ 0, ∀n,m ∈ K \ {k}. (38)
We note that the term
β0
σ2
1
Pu[n]
(‖qu[n]−wm‖2+H2)
in (38) is in
a similar form as the function f3(x1, x2). Consequently, we
8replace c, x1, x2, x˜1, and x˜2 in (37) with
β0
σ2
, 1
Pu[n]
, ‖qu[n]−
wm‖2 +H2, 1P˜u[n] , and ‖q˜u[n] −wm‖
2 +H2, respectively.
Furthermore, the term −√ςm[n] in (38) is a convex function
with respect to the slack variable ςm[n]. We note that any
super-level set of a convex function is non-convex. As such,
we can linearize the convex function −√ςm[n] by employing
the first-order approximation. Following the above discussion,
(38) can be rewritten as
β0
σ2
P˜u[n]
‖q˜u[n]−wm‖2 +H2 −
β0
σ2
( 1
Pu[n]
− 1
P˜u[n]
)
1
(P˜u[n])2
(‖q˜u[n]−wm‖2 +H2)
−
β0
σ2
(‖qu[n]−wm‖2 − ‖q˜u[n]−wm‖2)
1
P˜u[n]
(‖q˜u[n]−wm‖2 +H2)2
+ 1−
√
ς˜m[n]
− 1
2
(ς˜m[n])
−1
2 (ςm[n]− ς˜m[n]) ≥ 0, ∀n,m ∈ K \ {k}, (39)
where P˜u[n], q˜u[n], and ς˜m[n] are given feasible points.
Finally, we focus on tackling the constraint (35c). For given
feasible points R˜k,e[n] and τ˜k[n], the first-order restrictive
approximation of (35b) is given by
2R˜k,e[n] + 2R˜k,e[n] ln 2(Rk,e[n]− R˜k,e[n])−
√
τ˜k[n]
− 1
2
(τ˜k[n])
−1
2 (τk[n]− τ˜k[n]) ≥ 1, ∀k, n. (40)
So far, we have transformed the non-convex constraint (15b)
into the convex constraints (31), (34), (35a), (39) and (40).
Following the above transformations, we rewrite (P2.2) as
(P2.3) : max
Q,A,η,PU,RE,φ
U,V,Θ,S1,S2
η − ωφ
s.t. (15c), (15e), (15f), (15g), (17b),
(20), (24), (27), (31), (34), (35a), (39), (40), (41)
where U , {µk[n], ∀k, n}, V , {νk[n], ∀k, n}, Θ ,
{θk,m[n], ∀k, n,m ∈ K \ {k}}, S1 , {ςk[n], ∀k, n}, and
S2 , {τk[n], ∀k, n}. We note that problem (P2.3) is a convex
optimization problem, which can be solved by the convex
optimization tool, such as CVX [32].
B. Second-Order Cone Representation
In the previous subsection, we have transformed the original
optimization problem (P2) into the convex optimization prob-
lem (P2.3). We observe that problem (P2.3) is categorized
as a GNCP (i.e., generalized nonlinear convex programming)
due to the exponential function involved in the constraint
(35a) [33]. We should clarify that problem (P2.3) can indeed
be solved using the interior-point solver. However, solving
it directly often results in a high computational complexity
compared to other standard convex programs such as the
SOCP. This motivates us to further transform (P2.3) into
a standard convex program. Following this consideration, we
observe from problem (P2.3) that the objective function and
the constraints are linear or SOC presentable, except the
exponential cone constraint (35a). As such, in the following
we dedicate to converting (P2.3) into a SOCP. To this end,
we first present a proposition to reformulate (24), (27), (31)
and (39) into SOC constraints. Then, we focus on representing
the exponential cone constraint (35a) into a SOC form.
Proposition 1: The constraints (24), (27) and (31) can be
represented as the SOC constraints given by
∥∥∥∥αk[1]− µk[1], · · · , αk[N ]− µk[N ], Ak[n]− 12
∥∥∥∥
≤ Ak[n] + 1
2
, ∀k, (42)∥∥∥∥∥
√
β0P ks [n]
‖q˜u[n]−wk‖2 +H2 (qu[n]−wk)
T ,
Bk[n]− 1
2
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ Bk[n] + 1
2
, ∀k, n, (43)∥∥∥∥α1[n] + ν1[n], · · · , αK [n]+νK [n], α˜1[n]− ν˜1[n], · · · ,
α˜K [n]− ν˜K [n], Ck[n]− 1
2
∥∥∥∥ ≤ Ck[n] + 12 , ∀n, (44)
respectively, where Ak[n], Bk[n] and Ck[n] are defined in
(60), (62) and (64), respectively. In addition, the constraint
(39) can be reformulated as the following SOC constraints:
∥∥∥∥(qu[n]−wm)T , Dm[n]− 12
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ Dm[n] + 1
2
, (45)∥∥∥∥Pu[n]− ζ[n]2 , 1
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ Pu[n] + ζ[n]
2
, (46)
where Dm[n] is defined in (66) and ζ[n] is an introduced slack
variable.
Proof: The detailed proof is provided in Appendix B.
Now, we turn our attention to the exponential cone con-
straint (35a). In the existing work [33], the exponential func-
tion is first expanded using the Taylor series, and then the
resultant terms are converted into several SOC constraints.
Although a factor is introduced in [33] to control the ap-
proximation accuracy, it cannot guarantee that the Taylor
series expansion is an upper bound of the original exponential
function. This may lead to a solution to the SOCP problem that
is not feasible to the original problem. As such, it is important
to develop a restrictive approximation method to express the
exponential cone constraint into the SOC form. In this work,
we present a new method to overcome this problem. To this
end, we first present the following inequality [34]
log(x) ≥ log(x˜) + 2− 2
√
x˜√
x
, (47)
which holds for all x > 0 and x˜ > 0. We note that (47)
provides a lower bound of the logarithmic function and the
equality must hold for x = x˜. In the following, we use this
inequality to deal with the exponential cone constraint (35a).
To proceed, we first equivalently rewrite (35a) as
−σ2
P ks [n]λk,m
√
ςm[n]τk[n] ≤ log
(
1− 1
θk,m[n]
)
, (48)
9∀k, n,m ∈ K \ {k}. Following the inequality (47), the
restrictive approximation for (48) is given by
σ2
P ks [n]λk,m
√
ςm[n]τk[n] ≥ − log
(
1− 1
θ˜k,m[n]
)
− 2 +
2
√
1− 1
θ˜k,m[n]√
1− 1
θk,m[n]
, ∀k, n,m ∈ K \ {k}. (49)
For the newly constructed constraint (49), we provide the
following three facts. Firstly, we remark that (49) is stricter
than the original exponential cone constraint (35a), which
implies that the constraint (49) gives a safe approximation of
the constraint (35a). Secondly, we note that (49) and (35a)
are equivalent when θk,m[n] = θ˜k,m[n]. Thirdly, although
(49) cannot be represented as the SOC form directly, we can
introduce several slack variables to convert it into a SOC form.
In the following, we present a proposition to convert (49) into
the SOC form.
Proposition 2: The constraint (49) can be represented as the
following SOC constraints:∥∥∥∥πk,m[n]P ks [n]λk,mσ2 , ςm[n]− τk[n]2
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ςm[n]+τk[n]2 , (50)∥∥∥∥∥
̟k,m[n]− πk,m[n]− log
(
θˆk,m[n]
)
− 2
2
,
√
2θˆ
1
4
k,m[n]
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
̟k,m[n] + πk,m[n] + log
(
θˆk,m[n]
)
+ 2
2
, (51)∥∥∥∥̟k,m[n], −ξk,m[n]2
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 2− ξk,m[n]2 , (52)∥∥∥∥θk,m[n]− ξk,m[n]2 , 1
∥∥∥∥ ≤ θk,m[n] + ξk,m[n]2 , (53)
where πk,m[n], ̟k,m[n] and ξk,m[n], ∀k, n,m ∈ K\{k}, are
introduced slack variables, while θˆk,m[n] , 1− 1
θ˜k,m[n]
.
Proof: The detailed proof is provided in Appendix C.
So far, we have represented the exponential cone constraint
(35a) into the SOC constraints (50), (51), (52) and (53).
Following the above transformations, problem (P2.3) can be
approximately rewritten as the SOCP, which is given by
(P2.4) : max
Q,A,η,PU,RE,φ
U,V,Θ,S1,S2,S3,S4,S5,S6
η − ωφ
s.t. (15c), (15e), (15f), (15g), (17b), (20), (31), (34),
(40), (43), (44), (45), (46), (50), (51), (52), (53), (54)
where S3 , {ζ[n], ∀n}, S4 , {πk,m[n], ∀k, n,m ∈ K \
{k}}, S5 , {̟k,m[n], ∀k, n,m ∈ K \ {k}}, and S6 ,
{ξk,m[n], ∀k, n,m ∈ K \ {k}}.
We note that the SOCP (P2.4) introduces slack variables
ζ[n], πk,m[n], ̟k,m[n], and ξk,m[n]. However, the complexity
of solving an SOCP is greatly reduced compared to solving
GNCP of a similar size directly due to the tremendous progress
in current SOCP solvers [34].
Algorithm 1 P-SCA algorithm for Solving (P2)
1: Given a feasible point Z˜0 and an initial penalty parameter
ω0; Given c > 1 and ωmax; Set r = 0.
2: repeat
3: Solve (P2.4) with given a feasible point Z˜r and obtain
the current optimal solution Zr+1.
4: Update ωr+1 = min{cωr, µmax} and set Z˜r+1 =
Zr+1; Set the iteration number r = r + 1.
5: until Convergence.
C. Proposed P-SCA Algorithm for Solving (P2)
We recall that the original mixed-integer non-convex opti-
mization problem (P2) is first transformed into (P2.2), and
two problems are equivalent when φ → 0. Then, (P2.2)
is converted into a convex problem (P2.3), which is cate-
gorized as GNCP. To reduce the computational complexity
of GNCP (P2.3), we further transform it into a SOCP
(P2.4). We note that the feasible set of (P2.4) is stricter
than that of (P2.2) since a restrictive approximation method
is adopted. As a result, any feasible solution to (P2.4) is
also feasible to (P2.2). In addition, problem (P2.2) can be
solved by solving (P2.4) iteratively. The detailed algorithm
is shown in Algorithm 1, where Z˜r , {α˜rk[n], q˜ru[n], P˜ ru [n],
R˜rk,e[n], µ˜
r
k[n], ν˜
r
k[n], θ˜
r
k,m[n], ς˜
r
m[n], τ˜
r
k [n]}, Zr , {αrk[n],
qru[n], P
r
u [n], R
r
k,e[n], µ
r
k[n], ν
r
k[n], θ
r
k,m[n], ς
r
m[n], τ
r
k [n]}, and
r denotes the r-th iteration. We note that the penalty parameter
ω determines the relaxation level of problem (P2.2). A large
value of ω will force φ = 0, leading to αk[n] ∈ {0, 1}. We also
note that the initial penalty parameter is set to a small value to
provide high relaxation for the scheduling variable αk[n]. The
penalty parameter ω is increased by a constant c > 1 after each
iteration until a upper bound ωmax is achieved to guarantee
that φ = 0. Furthermore, numerical results show that φ is
eventually equal to 0 when the proposed P-SCA algorithm
converges, which further verifies that (P2) and (P2.2) are
equivalent.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate
the effectiveness of our developed P-SCA algorithm. To
demonstrate the benefit of our developed joint optimization
of the UAV’s trajectory and AN transmit power as well as
the redundancy rate and the SN scheduling strategy (denoted
as J-TPRS scheme), we compare it with a FT-PRS scheme.
Specifically, the FT-PRS scheme only designs the AN transmit
power and redundancy rate together with the SN scheduling
strategy based on Algorithm 1, while the UAV’s trajectory
is fixed with circular trajectory in which the circular tra-
jectory is given in [4]. Unless stated otherwise, the system
parameters are set as below. The number of SNs is set as
K = 4 and the corresponding horizontal coordinates of each
SN on the ground are set as [−240,−160]T , [160,−160]T ,
[240, 80]T and [0, 160]T . The UAV’s maximum AN transmit
power and each SN’s transmit power are assumed to be
Pumax = 36 dBm and P
k
s [n] = 30 dBm, ∀k, n, respectively.
The UAV’s maximum flying speed and its flying altitude are
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Fig. 2. Convergence performance of the proposed Algorithm 1 for different
values of ρ and ǫs.
set as Vmax = 10 m/s and H = 100 m, respectively. The
time slot length is δt = 1 s. Other simulation parameters
are set as: σ2u = −110 dBm, σ2m = −110 dBm, ∀m ∈ K,
λu,u = −60 dB, ρ = −60 dB, β0 = −60 dB, T = 210 s,
ǫr = 0.05 and ǫs = 0.05.
In Fig. 2, we examine the convergence behavior of the
proposed P-SCA algorithm, where Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) show
the variation of max-min ASR over iterations and the value
of introduced slack variable φ over iterations, respectively. In
Fig. 2(a), we first observe that the max-min ASR may be
unstable at some intermediate iterations. This is due to the
variation of penalty term ωφ in the objective function. We
also observe that the proposed algorithm converges within a
few tens of iterations. This is due to the fact that Algorithm 1
is equivalent to the traditional SCA algorithm when ω reaches
its upper bound (i.e., the penalty parameter ω is increased after
each iteration until reaching ωmax), while the convergence of
the SCA algorithm has been proven in [35]. In Fig. 2(b), we
observe that the value of φ converges to zero, which implies
that the obtained scheduling variables αk[n], ∀k, n, are binary
and the outputs of Algorithm 1 are feasible solution to the
original mixed-integer optimization problem (P2).
In Fig. 3, we plot the trajectories of the UAV achieved by
the J-TPRS scheme and the FT-PRS scheme with different
flight periods T , where the location of each SN is marked
with©. From this figure, we first observe that as flight period
T increases, the UAV takes full advantage of its controllable
mobility to adaptively adjust its trajectory to move closer to
each SN. For example, for T = 210 s, in the J-TPRS scheme
the UAV always flies at the maximum speed when the UAV is
between any two SNs, and it always reduces its flying speed or
even hovers for a period of time when it arrives at a location
near each SN, so that more confidential information can be
transmitted from the scheduled SN over a better ground-to-
air channel. This phenomenon can be directly confirmed by
the flight speed of the UAV, which is shown in Fig. 4(b). In
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Fig. 3. UAV’s trajectories achieved by the J-TPRS and FT-PRS schemes for
different values of the flight period T .
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Fig. 4. The UAV’s AN transmit power and its flying speed for different values
of the flight period T , where T = 210 s for (a) and (b), while T = 60 s for
(c) and (d).
Fig. 3, we also observe that when T is sufficient large (e.g.,
T = 210 s), the trajectory achieved by the J-TPRS scheme
always shrinks inward to generate more interference to other
unscheduled SNs. In addition, for T = 60 s, the UAV flies at
the maximum speed within the limited flight period T in order
to get as close to each ground SN as possible for shorter LoS
communication links.
In Fig. 4, we plot the UAV’s AN transmit power and its
flying speed achieved by the J-TPRS and FT-PRS schemes
for different values of the flight period T . In Fig. 4(a) and
Fig. 4(c), we first observe that the UAV’s AN transmit power is
symmetrical, and the symmetry points are located at 105 s and
30 s, respectively. This is due to the fact that the trajectories
of the UAV achieved by the J-TPRS and FT-PRS schemes for
T = 210 s and T = 60 s are symmetrical. From Fig. 4(a)
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Fig. 5. UAV’s trajectories and the AN transmit power achieved by the J-TPRS
scheme for different values of ǫs and ρ.
and Fig. 4(c), we also observe that when the UAV reaches
the area near the symmetrical point, the AN transmit power
achieved by the J-TPRS scheme is obviously smaller than that
of other locations. This is because the SN in the lower left
corner is scheduled at this period of time and the SN is far
away from other SNs. Thus, the UAV chooses a smaller AN
transmit power to reduce self-interference while satisfying the
required SOP constraint. In Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), as expected
we observe that the AN transmit power achieved by the J-
TPRS scheme remains constant when the UAV speed is zero.
From Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(d), we observe that the UAV always
flies with a constant speed in the FT-PRS scheme, which is
consistent with the introduced circular trajectory. Finally, we
should point out that there is no exact relationship between
the AN transmit power achieved by the J-TPRS and FT-PRS
schemes. Intuitively, we may think that when T is sufficiently
large (e.g., T = 210 s), the AN transmit power of FT-PRS
scheme is higher than that of J-TPRS scheme in most of the
flight period T , since the circular trajectory always expands
outwards. However, this contradicts to the observation made
in Fig. 4(a), which is due to the fact that the values of Rk,e[n]
are different (i.e., Rk,e[n] is an optimization variable and a
larger value of Rk,e[n] may require a smaller value of AN
transmit power) in the J-TPRS and FT-PRS schemes.
In Fig. 5, we plot the UAV’s trajectories and AN transmit
power achieved by our developed J-TPRS scheme for different
SOP levels ǫs and different self-interference levels ρ. In
Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b), we first observe that as the ǫs decreases,
the UAV’s trajectory shrinks inward and its AN transmit power
increases. This is due to the fact that the SOP constraint
becomes stricter as ǫs decreases. Thus, the UAV selects a
trajectory closer to each SN and uses a larger AN transmit
power to satisfy the SOP constraint. In Fig. 5(c) and Fig. 5(d),
we observe that the UAV’s trajectory shrinks inward as the
self-interference level ρ increases, and its AN transmit power
decreases as ρ increases. This is due to the fact that with
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Fig. 6. Max-min ASR (average secrecy rate) achieved by the J-TPRS and
FT-PRS schemes versus flight period T for different ǫs and ρ.
the increasing of self-interference level ρ, the UAV prefers
to select a trajectory closer to each SN to decrease its AN
transmit power and reduce self-interference.
In Fig. 6, we plot the max-min ASR achieved by the J-TPRS
and FT-PRS schemes versus the flight period T for different
ǫs and ρ. In this figure, we first observe that the max-min
ASR achieved by the J-TPRS scheme increases with flight
period T . This is due to the fact that a larger T provides a
larger degree of freedom for UAV to adjust its flight trajectory
to improve max-min ASR. In this figure, we also observe
that the max-min ASR obtained by the FT-PRS scheme does
not increase with the increase of T and the J-TPRS scheme
always achieves a higher max-min ASR than the FT-PRS
scheme. This observation demonstrates the importance of the
UAV trajectory optimization and the advantage of the J-TPRS
scheme. In addition, as expected we observe that the max-min
ASR obtained by both J-TPRS and FT-PRS schemes decreases
as the self-interference level ρ increases, while it increases as
ǫs increases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we addressed confidential data collection in
UAV networks based on the physical layer security techniques.
We first derived analytical expressions for the ROP and
SOP for the considered system, based on which we jointly
optimized the UAV’s trajectory and AN transmit power as
well as the transmission rates and SN scheduling to maximize
the minimum ASR subject to some specific constraints. To
tackle the formulated mixed-integer non-convex optimization
problem, we first transformed it into a GNCP, and then we
further converted the resultant optimization into a standard
SOCP to reduce the computational complexity. Finally, a novel
iteration procedure based on P-SCA algorithm was developed
to obtain a suboptimal solution to the formulated optimization
problem. Numerical results showed that the UAV’s trajectory
design is critical in the considered system and our developed
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Bk[n] ,
−β0P ks [n]ρλu,u ln ǫr(−Pu[n] + P˜u[n])
−ρP˜u[n]λu,u ln ǫr + σ2u
+
((‖q˜u[n]−wk‖2 +H2) (−ρP˜u[n]λu,u ln ǫr + σ2u)+ β0P ks [n]
)
ln 2
×

log2

1 + β0P
k
s [n]
‖q˜u[n]−wk‖2+H2
−ρP˜u[n]λu,u ln ǫr + σ2u

 −Rk,e[n]− µk[n]

+ β0P ks [n]‖q˜u[n]−wk‖2‖q˜u[n]−wk‖2 +H2 . (62)
solution achieves a significant performance gain relative to
benchmark schemes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We first substitute the Ck,u[n] detailed in (6) into the
definition of prok [n] detailed in (9) and obtain that
prok [n] = Pr
(
|gu,u[n]|2 > P
k
s [n]|hk,u[n]|2
(2Rk,u[n] − 1)ρPu[n]
− σ
2
u
ρPu[n]
)
.
(55)
We recall that the term |gu,u[n]|2 in (55) follows an expo-
nential distribution with parameter 1
λu,u
. Thus, prok [n] can be
derived as
prok [n] = exp
[ −1
ρPu[n]λu,u
(
P ks [n]|hk,u[n]|2
2Rk,u[n] − 1 − σ
2
u
)]
= exp

 −1
ρPu[n]λu,u

 β0P
k
s [n]
‖qu[n]−wk‖2+H2
2Rk,u[n] − 1 − σ
2
u



 . (56)
Similarly, we substitute (8) into the definition of psok [n]
detailed in (10) and rearrange (10) as
psok [n] = Pr
(
max
m∈K\{k}
̺u,k,m[n]|gk,m[n]|2 > 2Rk,e[n] − 1
)
,
(57)
where ̺u,k,m[n] ,
Pks [n]
Pu[n]|hu,m[n]|2+σ2m
. We note that the
random variable ̺u,k,m[n]|gk,m[n]|2 involved in (57) follows
an exponential distribution with parameter 1
̺u,k,m[n]λk,m
. As
such, psok [n] can be derived as
psok [n]=1−Pr
(
max
m∈K\{k}
̺u,k,m[n]|gk,m[n]|2 ≤ 2Rk,e[n]−1
)
= 1−
∏
m∈K\{k}
[
1− exp
(
1− 2Rk,e[n]
̺u,k,m[n]λk,m
)]
= 1−
∏
m∈K\{k}

1−exp

 β0Pu[n]‖qu[n]−wm‖2+H2 + σ2m
−Pks [n]λk,m
2Rk,e[n]−1



 .
(58)
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
1) The constraint (24): To rewrite the constraint (24) into
the SOC form, let us first rearrange it as
N∑
n=1
[
(αk[n]− µk[n])2
] ≤ Ak[n], ∀k, (59)
where
Ak[n] ,
N∑
n=1
[
2(α˜k[n] + µ˜k[n])(αk[n] + µk[n])
− (α˜k[n] + µ˜k[n])2
]− 4Nη. (60)
We observe that the LHS and the RHS of the (59) are quadratic
term and linear term, respectively. Following the fact that
linear term Ak[n] defined in (60) can be equivalently rewritten
as
(
Ak[n]+1
2
)2
−
(
Ak[n]−1
2
)2
. Then, we can obtain the desired
result in (42).
2) The constraint (27): We note that (27) can be rearranged
as
β0P
k
s [n]‖qu[n]−wk‖2
‖q˜u[n]−wk‖2 +H2 ≤ Bk[n], ∀k, n, (61)
where Bk[n] is defined in (62), shown at the top of this page.
Similar to the derivation of (59), the constraint (61) can be
rewritten as the standard SOC constraint shown in (43).
3) The constraint (31): To transform (31) into an SOC
constraint, we first rearrange it as
K∑
k=1
[
(αk[n]+νk[n])
2+(α˜k[n]−ν˜k[n])2
] ≤ Ck[n], ∀n, (63)
where
Ck[n] , 4ǫs +
K∑
k=1
2(α˜k[n]− ν˜k[n])(αk[n]− νk[n]). (64)
Then we can obtain the SOC form of the constraint (31) shown
in (44).
4) The constraint (39): To deal with the constraint (39), we
introduce slack variables ζ[n], ∀n, and equivalently rewrite it
as
‖qu[n]−wm‖2 ≤ Dm[n], ∀n,m ∈ K \ {k}, (65a)
1
Pu[n]
≤ ζ[n], ∀n, (65b)
where
Dm[n] , (‖q˜u[n]−wm‖2 +H2)(2 − P˜u[n]ζ[n])
+
[
1−
√
ς˜m[n]− 1
2
(ς˜m[n])
−1
2 (ςm[n]− ς˜m[n])
]
× (‖q˜u[n]−wm‖
2 +H2)2
β0
σ2
P˜u[n]
+ ‖q˜u[n]−wm‖2. (66)
We note that Dm[n] is a linear function with respect to the
slack variables ςm[n] and ζm[n]. Thus, it can be equivalently
rewritten as
(
Dm[n]+1
2
)2
−
(
Dm[n]−1
2
)2
. Following this fact,
(65a) can be rewritten as the SOC constraint (45). In addition,
(65b) can be reformulated as the SOC constraint (46) directly.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
To proceed, we introduce slack variables πk,m[n],
∀k, n,m ∈ K \ {k}, and rewrite (49) as
σ2
P ks [n]λk,m
√
ςm[n]τk[n] ≥ πk,m[n], (67a)
− log
(
θˆk,m[n]
)
− 2 +
2
√
θˆk,m[n]√
1− 1
θk,m[n]
≤ πk,m[n]. (67b)
∀k, n,m ∈ K\{k}, where θˆk,m[n] , 1− 1
θ˜k,m[n]
. We observe
that (67a) can be rewritten as the SOC constraint directly,
which is shown in (50). In addition, (67b) can be rewritten as
− log
(
θˆk,m[n]
)
− 2 +
2
√
θˆk,m[n]
̟k,m[n]
≤ πk,m[n], (68a)√
1− ξk,m[n] ≥ ̟k,m[n], (68b)
1
θk,m[n]
≤ ξk,m[n], (68c)
∀k, n,m ∈ K\{k}, where̟k,m[n] and ξk,m[n] are introduced
slack variables. We note that (68a), (68b) and (68c) admit the
SOC-representation, which are given by (51), (52) and (53).
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
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